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SENTENCING DISPARITY: CAUSES AND CURES
JULIAN C. D'ESPOSITO, JR.
Sentencing theories have fluctuated between
two extremes: identical disposition of all persons
convicted of the same offense,' and individualized
disposition based on the character of the offender.
2
The rigidity and consequent harshness of uniform
sentencing' applied without reference to aggravat-
ing or mitigating factors led to the development
of the indeterminate sentence, parole, and other
forms which took into account the personality
of the offender and the circumstances of the offense.
Individualized disposition as it exists today,4
however, presents the possibility that the judge
will abuse his discretion by imposing different
sentences for the same offense without justifica-
tion.,
Since the purpose of individualized sentencing
is to base the punishment on the personality of the
1 C. BECcARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISH-
MENTS (2d ed. English trans. 1769).
2 B. RUSH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE EFF cTS or
PUBLIC PtUNISHMENTS UPON CanINvAIS AND UPON
SocIETY (1787). Dr. Rush advocated that punishments
be of indefinite duration according to the temper of the
offender and the progress of his rehabilitation. The
only limits on length should be kept secret, not disclosed
to the prisoner.
3 P. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND) CORRECTION
430-31 (1960).
4 The legitimate complaint has been made that the
judge in some jurisdictions has very few alternatives to
imprisonment since methods of punishment other than
incarceration are highly underdeveloped. This com-
ment in no way disagrees with the development of
individualized sentencing techniques. But as these
alternatives are authorized by legislatures, guidelines for
their proper utilization must be developed and observed.
5 George, Comparative Sentencing Techniques, 23
FED. PROB. 27 (1959).
criminal as well as the gravity of the crime,6
statistics should show differences in sentence for
the same crime. Disparity, however, is unjustified
if the rationale for these differences cannot be
traced to relevant distinctions of character or
behavior which bear a certain known relationship
to the aims of punishment. Individualized sen-
tencing is abused when the type and length of
sentence depends on the identity of the particular
trial judge exercising unchecked judicial discre-
tion within a wide range of statutory sentencing
alternatives.
In the United States the trial judge has no ex-
ternal legislative guidelines which delineate sen-
tencing factors and their relative weight. Although
most judges could point to factors which influence
their choice of sentence, these factors lack ob-
jectivity. In another courtroom the same factors
might be ignored or given different weight in
the imposition of sentence. Subjectivity in sen-
tencing, lack of proper guidelines, and virtual
absence of limitations on the exercise of judicial
discretion have produced unjustified disparity.
This comment will suggest means to control the
6 To individualize sentences properly the judge
must first differentiate between the offender and others
with regard to personality, character, socio-cultural
background, the motivations of his crime, and his
particular potentialities for reform or recidivism. Then
he must determine which among a range of punitive,
corrective, psychiatric, and social measures is best
adapted to solve the individualized set of problems
presented by that offender so his propensity for
recidivist conduct is reduced. Glueck, The Sentencing
Problem, 20 FED. PROB. 15 (Dec. 1956).
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exercise of discretion while proper guidelines for
sentencing are being developed.
The imposition of disparate sentences upon
offenders with similar characteristics convicted
of similar crimes hinders correctional methods.
When an offender receives an unjustified sentence,
his antagonism toward society is increased. He
becomes a discipline problem, 7 and a barrier to
rehabilitation is erected.8 His family lives in an
aura of injustice. Confidence in the administra-
tion of the legal system is shaken. 9 Not only
does disparity harm the prisoner and the prison
system, but it is contrary to the basic concept
of equal treatment under the law embodied in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion." Distinctions in treatment should be neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable; they should be based
on rational distinctions rooted in significant fac-
tual differences which have a substantial relation
to a legitimate governmental purpose.
Few would challenge the need for a system of
penal disposition based on individualization of
punishment. 2 Yet the attempt to effectuate such
a system has placed an enormous amount of
7A committee appointed in Connecticut to study
the causes of prison unrest and riots noted the relation-
ship between prisoner discontent and alleged inequality
in sentences. CoNN. GovEmoii's PRISON STUDY Com-
xaTTEE, FIRsT INrxwm REPORT 1 (1956), quoted in
Note, Appellate Reuiew of Primary Sentencing Decisions:
A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L. J. 1453, 1460
(1960).
8 "There is no factor more disturbing to institutional
routine and discipline than the question of comparative
justice. Prisoners finding themselves convicted of
similar crimes, compare experiences and quickly make
evaluations which lead to the conclusion that they
were unfairly punished. This feeling is frequently
found to be the germ of much rioting and disorder and
the basis of many serious escapes and other crimes
within institutions. Moreover, prisoners leaving our
institutions, embittered and laboring under the feeling
that they have been mistreated, return to the com-
munity and frequently pursue a career of crime with
serious results to local communities." Flannagan,
Reasons for Creation of a Court of Sentence Adjustment
(unpublished report), quoted in Ploscowe, Tle Court
and the Correctional System, in CONTVMORARY COR-
REcAxoN 57 (P. Tappan ed. 1951).
9 Smith, The Sentencing Council and the Problem of
Disproportionate Sentences, 11 PRAc. LAW 12, 13 (Feb.
1965).
"Due process is secured by laws operating on al
alike, not subjecting the individual to the arbitrary
exercise of the powers of government unrestrained by
the established principles of private right and dis-
tributive justice. Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692
(1891). Laws may not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious. The means chosen by the government must
have a substantial relation to the object sought to be
obtained. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933).
" But see Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of
Punishment, 6 REs JuDicATAE 224 (1953).
unchecked power over individual liberty in the
hands of the judiciary. Traditional notions of due
process and equal protection must provide the
legal framework for the development of indi-
vidualized treatment of offenders based on the
type of offense, the personality of the offender,
and individual and societal needs for deterrence.
Where the inadequacy of institutional resources 8
and insufficient knowledge about correctional
goals and methods enlarge the difficulties of
properly individualized sentencing, the type and
length of penal disposition should be closely
balanced by social and legal notions of equality.
Legal structures make their singular contribu-
tion to the dilemma of the trial judge who must
make and act on judgments where a lack of
certainty about dispositional effectiveness makes
the reliability and validity of such judgments
questionable.14 The existing system, although it
offers a reasonable and desirable opportunity for
individualized sentencing, iails to provide ade-
quate standards for sentencing and sufficient
checks upon the exercise of judicial discretion.
It is this failure that has produced unjustified
and harmful sentence disparity in the United
States.
THE EXTENT OF DISPARITY
Sentencing statistics from the Federal Bureau
of Prisons show widespread differences for sen-
tence lengths and release times both in federal
and in state prisons. 5 For example, with the same
statutory alternatives, federal judges in North
Carolina sentenced narcotics law violators to an
average sentence of 77.6 months while federal
judges in South Carolina sentenced others, con-
victed of identical crimes, to an average of 56.3
months. Forgers sentenced in the Federal District
Court for the Western District of Texas received
43.0 month sentences, while similar offenders in
the Southern District of Texas received 27.2
month terms. For the same number of forgery
offenses the court in the Northern District of
Indiana imposed sentences of 36.0 months, while
13 See generally THE PRBSnDENT'S CoAmIssIoN ON
LAW ENPORCENENT AND ADLnIsTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TAsx FORcE REPoRm: CoRCR0coNs (1967).
"4 Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and
Sentencing Process, 75 HAuv. L. REv. 904, 927 (1962).
See Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the
Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. Cnms. L.C. & P.S 226
(1959).
15 See U.S. DxP oF JUsTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS, STATISTICAL REPORT 46-47 (1966).
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the court in the Southern District of Indiana
handed down only 19.6 month sentences.
16
Median times served by offenders released
from state prisons indicate the same widespread
differences. 7 Since these differences could be
explained by judicial reaction to varying regional
crime rates or by the variances in penal and proba-
tional facilities, or by factual differences in the
circumstances of the crime, or the personality
of the criminal, they do not prove that disparity
is unjustified. Although the statistics do suggest
an abuse of judicial discretion, other empirical
studies of an intra-jurisdictional nature have
shown that the identity of the trial judge is a
factor which influences the severity of sentence.
An older study proceeded on the premise that a
just and scientific exercise of discretion in a large
enough sample of cases ought to be reflected in a
certain uniformity of disposition. 8 The study
found extreme disparity in disposition from judge
to judge.' 9 Common characteristics of the crime
or criminal apparently carried different weight
with each of the judges.'1
16 Id
17 U.S. DEPT OF JUsTI cE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS, STATE PRISON STATISTICs 52 (1964) Differ-
ences in state sentencing statistics may be partially
explained by various statutes existing within each
jurisdiction which set the limits of the sentence and
which allocate the sentencing function between judge
and parole board. See Note, Statutory Structures for
Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 CoLom. L. REv. 1134
(1960).
18 Gaudet, Harris, and St. John, Individual Differ-
ences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, 23 J.
CRni. L.C. & P.S. 811 (1933); Gaudet, Tte Differences
between Judges in the Granting of Sentences of Proba-
tion, 19 Tmmrm L. Q. 471 (1946).
19 Gaudet, Harris, and St. John, supra note 18, at
816.
Percentage of Sentences Imposed
Setne judge judge judge judge judge judge
Setne A B C D E F
jail ........... 35.6 33.6 53.3 57.7 45.0 50.0
Probation ..... 28.5 30.4 20.2 19.5 28.1 32.4
Fine .......... 2.5 2.2 1.6 3.1 1.9 1.9
Suspended
Sentence .... 33.4 33.8 24.3 19.7 25.0 15.7
Number of
Cases ....... 1235 1693 1869 1489 480 676
2 Accord, Somit, Tanenhaus, & Wilke, Aspects of
Judicial Sentencing Behavior, 21 U. PIT. L. REv. 613
(1960). The New Jersey study has been criticized,
however, for insensitivity to the type of crime, the
number of acts charged, the circumstances surrounding
the crime, and the past criminal record of the offender.
E. GREEN, JUDICIAL ATTITrmEs IN SENTENCING 17
(1961).
A Texas study attempted to determine the
influence on sentences of variables in the adminis-
tration of the criminal process and the personal
characteristics of the offender."s The statistical
method used permitted a determination of the
relative impact on sentence severity of each factor
while all other known variables were held con-
stant. The relative impact of these variables on
sentence severity was measured in terms of units
of increasingly severe disposition ranging from
fine through incarceration to death. If any differ-
ences in sentence were to be justified, two hypothe-
ses had to be verified: 1) Variations within a
relevant individual characteristic ought to be
reflected in a difference in impact on predicted
sentence severity. 2) Variations in a factor repre-
senting an element in the administration of the
criminal system or an irrelevant individual charac-
teristic ought to have no significant impact on the
severity of the disposition."
The sample showed that the identity of the
trial judge had a statistically significant impact
on the severity of the sentence. These differences
were attributed to conflicts in the judges' penal
philosophies, judicial personalities, social back-
grounds, and temperaments." Other factors in the
administration of the criminal process, whether
the defendant was freed on bail or detained,
whether counsel was retained or appointed, had a
measurable impact on sentence severity.'4 Among
factors representing relevant individual charac-
teristics of offenders, sentence severity was affected
only by variations in the offense charged, prior
felony convictions, and sex; variations in age,
marital status, and educational level, although
considered relevant were not statistically sig-
nificant.'
5
A study of the Philadelphia Court of Quarter
Sessions also showed sentence disparity based
2" Comment, Texas Sentencing Practices: A Statistical
Study, 45 TEXAs L. REv. 471 (1967).
2 Id. at 483.
21 Id. at 489-90.
24 Id., at 485-87. The authors of the Texas study
found no statistically significant differences in sentences
whether the defendant pleaded guilty or was convicted
at trial. Contra, Newman, Pleading Guilty for Con-
siderations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 3. Cnmt. L.C.
& P.S. 780, 784 (1956).
"5 Comment, supra note 21, at 499. Statistical
analysis of individualized sentencing is exceedingly
difficult since by definition there is no specific set of
variables operating within each case. Because the
particular facts of each case serve as the basis for the
sentence, it is difficult to pinpoint these factors and
control for them.
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on the choice of the judge2 6 It was the most pro-
nounced in moderately serious cases, tapering off
gradually as the cases approached the extremes
of mildness or seriousness. The author attributed
instances of disparity to differences in judicial
personality and to ambiguity in perception of
the relevant factors about the circumstances of
the crime or criminal.
Other evidence indicates that disparity can
be attributed to the identity of the sentencing
judge, whose subjective judgments enter the
process of individualization. Since 1958, Sen-
tencing Institutes have been held for the purpose
of studying and formulating sentencing objectives
and criteria for the federal courts.? At the work-
shops held during the Institutes, sample cases
are given to the participating judges. Since each
judge is given an identical pre-sentence report,
any difference in sentence can only be attributed
to the variety of judicial conceptions about the
weight to be given certain factors in sentencing.
Disparity in sentence can only be attributed to
the sentencing judge, rather than differences in the
case.n
When this technique was used at a Third
Circuit Institute, the sentences for auto theft
ranged from 79 days in jail to five years in prison.
In a mail fraud case the sentences for the same
offender ranged from eighteen months to fifteen
years. In an income tax case the offender received
from a $5,000 fine to five years in jail and a $10,000
fine. An embezzler drew recommendations from
one year's probation to five years in prison.
29
These examples illustrate widespread inequality
in sentences, a disparity that can only be attrib-
uted to the abuse of judicial discretion. Proper
individualization of punishment can only take
place through the use of judicial discretion, but
judicial sentencing power must be given proper
goals and boundaries within which to operate.
26 E. GREEN, JuIniciAL ATTITUDEs IN SENTENCING
(1961).
28 U.S.C. § 334 (1964).
2 The absolute validity of these statistics is doubtful
since the atmosphere, tension, and responsibility of
the courtroom could not be measured. Yet, since each
case had the same facts, the statistical problems with
actual courtroom sentencing were avoided.
2 Celler, Legislative Views on the Importance of the
Sentencing Institute, 30 F.R.D. 471, 472 (1962). While
these figures represent the extremes, an analysis of the
practice cases used in the Seventh Circuit shows that
the disparity was widespread as well as extreme. No
more than fifty percent of the judges gave the same
sentence. Seminar and Institute on Disparity of Sen-
tences, 30 F.R.D. 500-505 (1962). See also Appendix A,
infra.
Both the legislatures and the courts have failed
to accomplish this.
THE CAUSES Or, DISPARITY
The precipitant of disparity has been the trend
toward individualization of sentences. While
present statutes give the trial judge widespread
discretion in the type and length of sentence to
impose, neither the legislature through rational
penal codes, nor the appellate courts by judicial
review of sentences, provide any guidelines for
the exercise of judicial discretion. Improper or
inconsistent exercise of that discretion has thus
been the principal cause of disparity.
In attempting to provide sentencing altema-
tives that fit the offender, the legislatures have
given little direction for the proper use of in-
determinate, split, or definite sentences or pro-
bation.2 0 The legislatures, in authorizing long
sentences for most offenses, have increased the
judge's discretionary power without indicating
for whom the long sentence is intended. Addi-
tionally, the courts have failed to control their
use of discretion by providing for appellate review
of sentences.
Innumerable types of state statutes allocate
authority over sentence length and release time
to the legislatures, the courts, and the parole
boards in different proportions. These divisions of
authority can be grouped into four basic classifi-
cations: 31 1) the maximum sentence length and the
minimum term are fixed by the courts; 2 2) the
maximum is fixed by statute, the minimum by
the court;" 3) the maximum is fixed by the court,
30 An indeterminate sentence is the use of a minimum
and maximum term, the former set by the judge.
Parole eligibility comes upon completion of the mini-
mum. A definite sentence involves a minimum which
bears a statutorily fixed relation to the maximum. A
split sentence combines a short term of incarceration
with a longer period of probation. These definitions
tend to vary from state to state. The above apply on
the federal level. See notes 36-39, infra.31 See Note, Statutory Structure for Sentencing Felons
to Prison, 60 CoLu:. L. REv. 1134 (1960) for a detailed
analysis of sentencing statutes.
2 A uz. R.v. STAT. ANN. § 13-1643 (1956); Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 38, § 1-7(e) (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:
164-17 (Supp. 1967). In some states the minimum may
be fixed by the court but only up to a -term which is a
certain percentage of the maximum. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 1057 (1964). Other states give the judge total
discretion to fix the minimum, with the result that a
minimum may be within one year of the maximum,
e.g., 9-10 years. ILL. REv. Sicr. ch. 38, § 1-7(e) (1961).
3 HAWAII REv. LAws § 258-52 (1965); Micr.
STAT. ANN. § 28.1080 (1954).
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the minimum by statute;" 4) the statutory maxi-
mum and minimum are applied by the court. 5
On the federal level, statutory dispositions
which are available for each offender include: 1)
a definite sentence fixed by the court with parole
eligibility at Y of the sentence;" 2) a split sen-
tence, up to six months in jail, and up to the
maximum for the offense on probation;7 3) an
indeterminate sentence where the minimum
parole date, which cannot be more than Y3 of
the maximum term, is set by the court,= or, where
no minimum is set, and the release time is left
up to the parole board;39 4) a sentence for the
maximum term, with a three month commitment
for observation followed by resentencing based
on the observer's report.
4
1
By a manipulation of the maximum and mini-
mum terms of the indeterminate sentence,4' a
judge can individualize the sentence, differentiat-
ing between offenders on the basis of his subjective
perceptions of what factors are relevant to the
sentence. The judge, to the extent that he is able
to control the minimum term, deprives the parole
board of its function of determining the release
date of the prisoner.
Not only is there misuse of the indeterminate
sentence, but there is an unfortunate amount of
confusion about the use of different types of
sentences. This is particularly clear in the federal
courts where the judge has many sentencing
alternatives. The Sentencing Institute cases show
a general lack of consensus among the judges,
not only about the length but also the type of
sentence.C
Penal codes generally have failed to make
meaningful classifications of crimes according to
their severity. There are far too many differences
in statutory sentence lengths based upon dis-
tinctions which have no bearing on the relative
34TEx. CODE Cm. Poc. art. 42.09 (1966); Wisc.
STAT. ANN. § 959.05 (Supp. 1968).
35 CAL. PEN. CODE § 3023 (1956); Omo REv. CODE
§ 5145.01 (1964).
86 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1964).
7 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964).
33 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(1) (1964).
39 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1964).
40 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b) (1964).
41 The use of an indeterminate sentence can lead to a
variety of sentences within a single jurisdiction. Out of
194 successive admissions to a Massachusetts prison in
one year, 53 different types of sentences were involved.
Glueck, Predictive Devices and the Individualization of
Justice, 23 LAw & CoNTEM,. PRoB. 461, 464 (1958).
4 Seminar and Institute on Disparity of Sentences, 30
F.R.D. 458-59 (1962). See also Appendix A.
harmfulness of the conduct, the need for protect-
ing society from such harm, or the probable
dangerousness of the offender.
43
Unjustified sentence disparity has led com-
mentators to suggest three major remedies which
would provide standards for the exercise of judicial
discretion: 1) uniform revision of penal codes to
reclassify crimes according to severity and to
provide for shortened sentences for the ordinary
offender and extended terms for the special
offender within each class,44 2) control of the use of
minimum and maximum terms of the indetermi-




The necessary threshold reform of penal codes
is a reduction in the number and variety of dis-
tinctions among crimes and sentences. The possi-
bilities for a rational legislative delineation of
crimes and penalties are exhausted by a few
categories of relative seriousness.0 The American
43Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model
Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 465, 473 (1961);
accord, Beckett, Criminal Penalties in Oregon, 40 OaR.
L. R v. 1, 8 (1960). Judge Beckett found that the
1,413 penal statutes of the Oregon Revised Statutes
contained 466 penalty types-a penalty that is distinct
from all other penalties and may be prescribed for one
or more crimes.
44 A s icAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINI-
MUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PRO-
CEDuRES (TENT. DaFT, DEC. 1967) (hereinafter
A.B.A. STaNmARs: SENTENCING); A.L.I. MODEL
PENAL CODE (1962) (hereinafter M.P.C.); ADvisoRY
COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
C2nIE AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT
(1963) (hereinafter M.S.A.); Flood, The Model Sentenc-
ing Act, 9 CnR= AND DELINQUENCY 370 (1963); Mur-
rah & Rubin, Penal Reform and the Model Sentencing
Act, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 251 (1964); Ohlin & Remington,
Sentencing Structure: Its Effect upon Systems for the
Administration of Criminal Justice, 23 LAw AND
CONTEMP. PRoB. 495 (1958); Rubin, Allocation of
Authority in the Sentencing-Correction Decision, 45
TEXAs L. R.Ev. 455 (1967); Tappan, Sentencing under
the Model Penal Code, 23 LAw Am CONTEmnp. Prob.
528 (1958); Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the
Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 465 (1961).
45 Id.46 AmEIrcAN BAR ASSOCIATION PRojECT ON MINI-
sUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE REvIEw oF SENTENCES
(Tent. Draft April 1967) (hereinafter A.B.A. STAND-
ARDs: APPELLATE REviEw); Hearings on S. 2722
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1966); Mueller, Penology on Appeal:
Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15
VAND. L. REv. 671 (1962).
7 M.P.C. § 6.01, Comment p. 10 (Tent. Draft #2,
1954); A.B.A. STANnARDS: SENTENCING § 2.1 (a);
M.S.A. §§ 7-9.
[Vol. 60
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Law Institute's Model Penal Code, recognizing
that the length and nature of the sentence must
rest in part upon the seriousness of the crime,
has established three categories of felonies with
appropriately graduated penalties. The Model
Sentencing Act gives minimal attention to the
nature of the crime, but rather focuses on the
personality of the offender. Both proposals pro-
vide for an extended sentence based on the charac-
ter of the offender.4
The Model Penal Code, The Model Sentencing
Act, and The American Bar Association Standards
agree that there is no rationality to a system that
authorizes long sentences based solely on the type
of crime committed. The presence of high maxi-
mum terms, originally intended to arm the courts
against the particularly dangerous offender, has
led to the imposition of these inordinately long
sentences on offenders who neither need nor
deserve them. This drives sentence lengths beyond
the term needed for the average offender and
offers an opportunity for the exercise of unchecked
judicial discretion likely to produce disparity.49
The model proposals attempt to isolate the charac-
teristics of the dangerous offender and provide
extended terms for him while protecting the or-
dinary offender from an excessive sentence. 0
4 Table showing minimum and maximum for
extended and ordinary terms under THE MODEL
PENAL CODE AND THE MODEL SENTENCiNG AcT:
Ordinary Extended
Minimum Mi ni- m Maxx'-
&rs s.) (yrs.
Model Penal Code
1st degree ......... 1 1-10 1 life
2nd degree ........ 1-3 10
3rd degree ......... 1-2 5
Model Sentencing Act
1st degree........ none life I
Atrocious crimes*... none 0-10








Sources: M.P.C. §§ 6.06-6.09; M.S.A. §§ 5, 7, 9.
49 Supra note 44; A.B.A. STAsRa ns: SENTENCING
§ 2.5, Comment p. 84.
60 M.S.A. § 5. The court may sentence a defendant
convicted of a felony to a term of 30 years if it finds
that one or more of the following exist: a) The de-
fendant is being sentenced for a felony in which he
inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm,
and the court finds that he is suffering from a severe
personality disorder indicating a propensity toward
criminal activity. b) The defendant is being sentenced
Although use of extended terms raises difficult
and largely unresolved questions of procedure"
and classification, 2 it seems wiser to run the risk
of possible misapplication of this device to a few
offenders rather than to continue to expose all
offenders to excessive sentences.5"
The primary effect of classifying offenses and
distinguishing between the ordinary and ex-
tended term is a proper focus on factors relevant
to the protection of society and the rehabilita-
tion of the criminal. Such a reform would in-
troduce rationality into the sentencing process
because the use of an ordinary and extended term
gives the sentence an objectivity relating to the
aims of correction, thus ensuing proper individu-
alization. A limitation on sentence length would
narrow the scope of judicial discretion, but only
reduce the possibilities for disparity. Within each
class of felony disparity would still be possible
unless the use of the indet&minate sentence is
controlled. 4
for a crime which seriously endangered the life or
safety of another, he has previously been convicted
for one or more felonies not related to the instant
crime as part of a single criminal episode, and the
court finds that he is suffering from a severe personality
disorder indicating a propensity toward criminal
activity. c) The defendant is being sentenced for the
crime of extortion, compulsory prostitution, selling
or knowingly and unlawfully transporting narcotics,
or other felony committed as a part of a continuing
criminal activity in concert with one or more persons.51 In revising its penal code, New York has refused to
adopt the MODEL PENAL CODE distinctions between
the ordinary and extended terms on the grounds that
the imposition of an extended term demanded certain
procedural safeguards which the legislature felt would
interfere with the sentencing process. Although THE
MODEL PENAL Code § 7.07(6) and THE MODEL
SENTENCING AcT § 4 attempt to solve these problems
by controlling disclosure of the pre-sentence report
and granting a right to cross-examination at a hearing
on the sentence, the New York commission refused to
propose a system in which an extended term was
based on a formal finding as to character. Proposed
N.Y. Penal Law Study Bill, Senate it. 3918, Assembly
Int. 5376, pp.274-77 (1964), quoted in A.B.A. STAND-
ARDs: SENTENCING § 2.5, Comment p. 89.
2 For a critique of M.S.A. § 5 definition of a pro-
fessional criminal, see A.B.A. StmARns: SENTENCING
§ 2.5, Comment p. 96. They suggest six criteria which
more clearly delineate the class: 1) He should be a part
of a continuing conspiracy. 2) The object of the
conspiracy should be a continuing illegal business. 3)
The defendant should have derived a major portion
of his income over a time from such an enterprise. 4)
He should have occupied a supervisory or other manage-
ment position in the operation. 5) He should be over
21. 6) The public needs the protection of a substantial
prison term.
3 A.B.A. STANDARDS: SF.NTENCING § 2.5, Comment p.
93.
64The Iinois Criminal Code, revised in 1961,
attempted to make broad gradations in sentence
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The model proposals differ over the value of
the judge's power to impose a term less than the
statutory maximum. It is argued by proponents
of the judicially fixed maximum that judges will
be sufficiently competent to individualize the
sentence on the basis of the crime and the offend-
er's personality 5 Moreover, they think that
the use of judicial discretion will decrease plea
bargaining and thus prevent the ultimate decision
over release time from shifting from the parole
board to the prosecutor 6 Finally, they argue
that parole authorities are not yet sufficiently
sophisticated to be given total discretion to
determine release time. Judicial determination
of the maximum sentence gives visibility to the
deterrent and retributive functions of punish-
ment.
On the other hand there are several arguments
in favor of a legislatively fixed maximum.n First,
if such a maximum is used, any difference in
sentence will be based on release time determina-
tions by the parole board rather than on subjec-
tive judicial delineations of the severity of the
crime. Secondly, a study undertaken for the
drafters of the Model Penal Code showed no
substantial increase in plea bargaining in states
with legislatively fixed maximums.2 To control
undesirable plea bargaining and to provide for
the presence of mitigating circumstances, the Code
gives the judge power to reduce the degree of the
severity. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 (1961). But since the
judge still has the authority to set both the minimum
and the maximum within the statute, ch. 38, § 1-7(e),
actual disparity will not be reduced. For example, the
statutory maximum for voluntary manslaughter is
twenty years. Through an indiscriminate use of the
indeterminate sentence, the judge has 95 possible
sentences from which he can choose to carry out his
perception of the factors relevant to the sentence.
(Number of possibilities = [n-l(u)]/2 with n equal to
the range between the minimum and maximum terms
under the statute.) Failure to control the use of the
indeterminate sentence is more of a cause of disparity
than the presence of excessive statutory terms.
55 A.B.A. STNDARuS: SENTENCING § 3.1; M.S.A. § 9.
56 Ohlin and Remington, Sentaecing Structure: Its
Effects upon Systems for the Administration of Criminal
Justice, 23 LAw AN D CONTEMP. PROB. 495, 500(1958).
If the judge must apply the statutory maximum term,
the defendant may bargain with the prosecutor for a
reduction of the charge in return for a guilty plea. Or
the defendant may refuse to plead guilty knowing that
the judge cannot take a guilty plea or mitigating
circumstances into account when fixing sentence. Thus
the accused has nothing to lose by standing trial. If,
however, the judge has discretion in setting the maxi-
mum, the defendant may plead guilty on the theory
that the judge will take this and other facts into
account when setting the maximum.
5 M.P.C. § 6.06.
58 Wechsler, supra note 44, at 479.
felony charged.59 The final argument is that
parole boards are the best qualified to make a
decision about the progress of the inmate toward
rehabilitation. There is no need to limit that
decision by a variation of the maximum term. The
necessary retributive and deterrent functions of
punishment can be fulfilled by a discretionary
use of a limited minimum term without altera-
tion of the maximum term.
To the extent that parole boards are influenced
by variation in the maximum term, statutory
maximums would more effectively reduce the
chances of objectionable disparity while amply
fulfilling the aims of correction. If, however,
plea bargaining actually increases and judges fail
to reduce charges when justice demands, the use
of a judicially fixed maximum would be superior.
Whichever alternative is adopted, judicial abuse
of the maximum term is only a secondary cause
of disparity when compared with the uncontrolled
application of the minimum term.
Since the focus of the Model Sentencing Act is
on rehabilitation and the parole board is in the
best position to determine the inmate's response
to rehabilitative efforts, the Act does not permit
the use of minimum terms.6 0 Release is totally
in the hands of the parole board. The Model
Penal Code, taking into account the deterrent
and retributive goals of punishment, provides
for an automatic minimum proportional to the
gravity of the felony." But recognizing the possi-
bility that correction will not be needed in specific
cases, the Code authorizes the institution to
petition for a resentence
6 2
The A.B.A. Standards take the most realistic
approach to the use of a minimum term. Since
it is unnecessary to imprison all offenders in
order to reassure the public, and since the legisla-
ture cannot precisely identify those offenders
who require even a minimum term, the proposal
gives a court authority to impose a short minimum
term after a finding that such a minimum is
necessary to protect the public from further
criminal conduct. 3 Since the minimum term
59 M.P.C. § 6.12. However, Prof. Wechsler admits
that courts may be more reluctant to reduce the degree
of crime than the sentence. Wechsler, supra note 44, at
478.
60 Flood, supra note 44, at 372-73.
61 M.P.C. § 6.06. See note 48, supra.
' M.P.C. § 7.08 (3).
6 A.B.A. STaNDARDS: SENTENCINO § 3.2 (c)(vi).
This way a prison can keep an inmate for a year if
necessary, yet release him if it finds that incarceration
was unnecessary or more harmful than probation.
The docket-crowding procedure of M: P. C. § 7.08 (3)
is avoided.
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does serve several legitimate purposes,6 ' the best
proposal is to make its use discretionary rather
than obligatory. By controlling the length of the
minimum term and by making its use dependent
on a finding by the judge that public safety re-
quires a minimum confinement, the aims of punish-
ment can be met while disparity attributable to
abuse of judicial discretion is reduced.
The most acute instance of disparity is imprison-
ment rather than fine, probation, or any other
alternative not involving confinement. The role
of the legislature in providing boundaries for
the exercise of judicial discretion is limited to
broad declarations of preferences for sentences
not involving confinement65 and to verbalizations
of standards for imprisonment based on the need
of the public for protection or the need of the
offender for institutional care. Sentencing coun-
cils and institutes provide the major hope for a
rational exercise of judicial discretion in this
area66 by producing a meaningful articulation of
sentencing goals.
The third major proposal for eliminating
sentence disparity is appellate review of sentences.
This would affect disparity in both sentence length
and the use of probation. The United States is
one of the few countries where the total decision
64 A minimum term 1) serves as a community re-
assurance, 2) shares the responsibility over release
between the judiciary and the parole board, 3) is an
institutional necessity for any valid correctional
program to operate, 4) serves the purpose of general
and special deterrence. A.B.A. STANDA.DS: SENTENciNG
§ 3.2, Comment p. 146-47.
65 The model proposals suggest that probation be
available for every offender except perhaps the most
serious. A.B.A. STANDARUS: SENTENCING §§ 2.2, 2.3;
M.P.C. § 7.01; M.S.A. §§ 1, 7-9; accord, ThE PREsi-
DENT'S COMUSSION ON LAW ENORCEMENT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTicE, TASK FoRcE REPORTS:
CORRECTIONS, Appendix A, p. 206 (1967); N.Y. PEN.
LAW § 65.00 (1967).
66 The Sentencing Council, used in the federal
district courts for the Northern District of Illinois, the
Eastern District of Michigan, and the Eastern District
of New York, has proved an effective, though limited
means of reducing disparity in sentences and increasing
the use of probation. Each judge in a panel of three is
supplied with a pre-sentence report for each offender
who is to be considered by the panel. Each judge then
summarizes the relevant factors on a sentencing sheet
and states his proposed disposition of the offender. The
panel than meets to discuss each case and the proposed
punishments. The ultimate sentence is the responsi-
bility of the judge who heard the case, but in approxi-
mately one out of three cases, the final sentence is
different from the original proposal. The Sentencing
Council has produced a set of workable standards
within the district court. Levin, Toward More En-
lightened Sentencing Procedure, 45 NEB. L. REv. 499
(1966); Smith, The Sentencing Council and the Problem
of Disproportionate Sentences, 11 PRAc. LAW. 12 (1965).
over a sentence rests with one man; 7 only thirteen
jurisdictions have statutes that specifically pro-
vide for a review of sentence.6
Prior to 1891 the old circuit courts had express
power to reduce legal but excessive sentences. 69
Presently, the circuit courts have power to re-
verse, modify, or affirm judgments on appeal
under a statute70 similar to some state statutes
in which the courts have found authority to
review sentences.7 But Judge Frank in U.S. v.
Rosenberg" held that, although the question of
statutory construction had never been decided
precisely, sixty years of authority established
that a federal appellate court had no control
over a sentence within the statutory limitY
More appellate courts, however, will most likely
begin to exert a limited but effective role in the
review of judicial sentencing discretion and the
elimination of disparity in light of the recom-
mendations of the American Bar Association
Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice74 and the recently enacted law providing
for appellate review of sentences in the federal
courts? 5
The presence of appellate review will have a
notable effect on both the trial judge and the
prisoner.7 6 The dialogue between the appellate
67 George, supra note 5. Practically all European
countries provide some sort of appellate review of
sentences. See Hearing on S. 2722 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 86-
100 (1966) (hereinafter Hearings on S. 2722).
68ARuz. REv. STAT. AiNN. § 13-1717 (1956); CoNr.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-194 (Supp. 1965); FLA. STAT.
§ 932.52 (Supp. 1966); HAWAn REv. LAWS § 212-14
(Supp. 1965); IIL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 A, § 615 (Supp.
1967); IowA CODE ANN. § 793.18 (1950); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2141-14 (Supp. 1966); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 26, §§ 132-38 (1966); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 278, §§ 28A-28D (1959); NEB. REv. STAT. §
29-2308 (1964); N.Y. ConE Canu. PRoc. §§ 543,764
(1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 138.050 (1963); TENN.
COnE AN. § 40-2711 (1955). See Mueller, Penology on
Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sen-
tences, 15 VAIN. L. RIEv. 671, at 689-97 (1962) for a
list of cases which interpret general statutes regarding
appellate jurisdiction as giving a court power to modify
legal but excessive sentences. Comm. v. Williams, 402
Pa. 48, 166 A.2d 44(1960); State v. Johnson, 67 N.J.
Super. 414, 170 A.2d 830 (App. Div. 1961).
69 Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 176, 20 Stat. 354.
70 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1964).
71 Mueller, supra note 68 for citations.
72 195 F.2d 583 (2nd Cir. 1952).
7Accord, Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 305 (1932); United States v. Martell, 335 F.2d
764, 767 (4th Cir. 1964).74 A.B.A. STANDARDS: APPELiATE REvIEw.
75 . 1540, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc.
9,132 (daily ed. June 29, 1967).
76 Address of Lord Ch. just. of England, Rt. Hon.
Baron Hewart of Bury to the Twelfth Annual Meeting
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and trial courts can lead to the development of
sentencing criteria regarding the use of the cumu-
lative sentence for conduct arising from a single
occasion,77 the use of probation, and the use of
the indeterminate sentence.n The appellate
courts can avoid stretching the law to reverse a
case where the real objection is the excessiveness
of the sentenceY9 The presence of appellate review
will force the trial judge to attempt to articulate
reasons for his sentence decision. Disparity will
occur less frequently if judges are required to
justify apparent inequality.
Review, by providing opportunities for the
airing of grievances, may also reduce the hostility
of prisoners to a judicial system which gives one
man so much control over their sentence8 Ap-
pellate review will provide a forum to remedy
unjustified sentence disparity and to establish
standards for sentencing. 8'
It is essential, however, that the appellate
court must itself have adequate standards and a
record upon which to base its decision. Unfor-
tunately, the lack of precision in correctional
goals and the inadequacy of means to accomplish
these goals necessarily inhibit creation of such
standards. The more uncertain the appellate
court is about the objectives of punishment and
their application to a particular offender, the
greater the likelihood that the court will feel
obliged to defer to the trial judge's discretion.
Accordingly, a system of standards for the peno-
correctional process must be articulated either
of the Canadian Bar Assoc., 5 CAN. B. REV. 564, 572
(1927) quoted in Note, Appellate Review of .Primary
Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69
YALE L. J. 1453, 1460 (1960).
7 Cumulative sentences are separate sentences, one
beginning at the expiration of the other.
78 Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 293
(1962) (remarks of Prof. Wechsler); 113 CoNG. REc.
9,132 (daily ed. June 29, 1967).7
9 Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. at 271
(1962) (remarks of Chief Judge Sobeloff). This seems to
be the effect of a practice in Oklahoma where appellate
courts reduce sentences for errors that do not rise to
the level of reversible error, e.g., Hudson v. State, 399
P.2d 296 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965); Henderson v. State
385 P.2d 930 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963).
80A.B.A. STANDARns: APPELLATE REviEw § 1.2,
Comment p. 25-26. However an article, Note, supra
note 76 at 1465, suggests that alleviation of unrest
may not be a realistic goal of review since prisoners
operate on a straight uniformity theory of sentencing
based only on the type of crime and prior criminal
record. The presence of review may increase prisoner
frustration when false hopes are destroyed.
81 Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal,
37 CoLum. L. Racv. 521, 762-63 (1937).
by the legislatureP or by the courts in the dialogue
of the common law process.83
To ensure effective review, the record on appeal
must contain a statement by the trial judge ex-
plaining the sentence, in addition to pertinent
information from the trial, the pre-sentence re-
port, and the transcript from the sentencing
hearing.N Not only will this statement be essential
for the reviewing court, but it will also aid the
correctional authorities in dealing with the of-
fender, and may be of therapeutic value to the
defendant.85
The major objections to appellate review of
sentences are that the court's docket will be
overburdened with frivolous appeals and that
review of sentence is beyond the traditional
powers of the court. The problem of an increase
in appeals is a serious one to which several solu-
tions have been proposed. Adoption of the English
system in which the defendant seeks leave to
appeal against sentence has been suggested.86
Although this procedure does give each sentence
a minimal review, an appeal conditioned on leave
of court substantially reduces the necessity for
4 M.P.C. § 1.02; See Hearings on S. 2722, supra
note 67, at 96 for examples from European codes.
83The English system of review operates free of
legislative standards, but it nonetheless has produced
practical principles which exert some influence on the
trial court. The court does not pretend to substitute its
own notion of the appropriate sentence. "It is only
when a sentence appears to err in principle that this
Court will alter it. If a sentence is excessive ... to such
an extent as to satisfy this Court that there was a
failure to apply the right principles, then this Court
will intervene." R. v. Bal, 35 Crim. App. 164 (1951).
Excessiveness seems to be a ground for modifying a
sentence when it surpasses an unexpressed norm
established by the court for a particular offense and
circumstances. If the sentence is within the proper
range, the court will not alter it, but if it goes beyond
the range, it will be reduced. Meador, Review of
Sentences in England, in A.B.A. ST~ADAms: APPELLATE
REvrEw 126,129. See Thomas, Theories of Punishment
in the Court of Criminal Appeal, 27 MOD. L. REv. 546
(1964).81A.B.A. STANmDA.Ds: APPELLATE REviEw § 2.3
(c); M.S.A. § 10; S. 1540, 113 CONG. REc. 9,132 (daily
ed. June 29, 1967).
8A.B.A. STmDAus: APPELLATE REviEw § 2.3,
Comment p. 45-46; Note, supra note 17, at 1165. Both
Pennsylvania and New Jersey require the trial judge
to state briefly the reasons for the sentence imposed.
SuPREsME COURT Or PENNSYLVANA RaLEs or CoURT,
RULE 43; SUPREMEn COURT Or NEw JERsEy RuLEs or
COURT, RuLEs 3:7-10(b). There is not much evidence
that this practice has contributed toward greater
rationality in sentencing. RunBr, TaE LAw or CpnmAi
CoRuctioN 122 (1963).
81 Approximately 8% of those eligible seek leave to
appeal, 9.5% of these motions are granted, and 6.5%
of those who perfect an appeal have their sentences
quashed or changed. Meador, supra note 83, at 122.
[Vol. 60
SENTENCING DISPARITY: CA USES AND CURES
full dress review and thus lightens the workload
of the court.?
Another proposed solution to the problem of
frivolous appeals has been a legislative grant to
the court of authority to increase the sentence.8
An increase was permitted until recently in Eng-
land, 9 but the stigma of unfairness was found to
outweigh the benefits from the very few cases
in which a too lenient sentence was increased."0
The original Senate bill91 allowing an increase
was amended to forbid it, in part because frivolous
appeals could be more effectively prevented by
the use of appeal by leave of court. Also, it was
feared that a statute authorizing increase raised
possible constitutional objections.92
The objection that appellate courts are ill-
adapted to the review of sentences93 is largely
belied by the experience of the English system
and the few American jurisdictions where an
appeal of sentence is allowed. In the past years
when the judge had little discretion in the setting
of sentence, appellate review would have served
no purpose. But today when statutes give the
judiciary great sentencing discretion, the appel-
late courts have a very real function in ensuring
proper exercise of that discretion. Admittedly,
appellate review is no panacea, nor is it yet per-
fectly developed. Failures at rationalization of
sentences by the trial judge,94 lack of communica-
8 Meador, supra note 83, at 121. S. 1540 is based on
the premise that appeal by leave of court will sub-
stantially prevent frivolous appeals and regulate the
court's docket. 113 CoNG. REc. 9,132 (daily ed. June
29, 1967).
sA. B. A. STNDAns: APPELLATE REviEw § 3.3
(Tent. Draft, Dec. 1967). Contra, A.B.A. SrANARs:
APPELLATE Ravmw § 3.4 (Tent. Draft, April 1967).
The Special Committee for the December Draft felt
that it was proper for the court to correct an exces-
sively low sentence. They argued that double jeopardy
was avoided if an increase was allowed only on the
defendant's appeal and that the threat of an increase
would be sufficient deterrent for frivolous appeals.
Comment p. 3-4 (Tent. Draft Dec. 1967).
89 Criminal Appeal Act of 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, §
4(3).
00 Meador, supra note 83, at 141-42 quoting from
REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COcaTTnEE ON
THm COURT OF CmnNAmL APPEAL (1965). As a result
of this Report, the Criminal Appeal Act of 1966 § 4
(2) was passed forbidding an increase of sentence on
appeal.
91 Hearings on S. 2722, at 2.
9 113 CoNG,. Rnc. 9,132 (daily ed. June 29, 1967).
For constitutional objections regarding double jeopardy,
see Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties
and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YaLE L.J.
606 (1965).93 Hart, The Ains of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW AN
CONTEmP. PROB. 401, 440 (1958).
94 Note, supra note 76, at 1466.
tion between appellate and trial courts, 9 and
the general hesitancy of appellate courts to exert
their influence on the sentencing process96 tend
to minimize the effectiveness of appellate review
of sentences, but do not diminish its possibilities.
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO DISPARITY
IN SENTENCES
The Constitution of the United States7 and
most state constitutions" have clauses prohibiting
cruel and unusual punishment.9" Whether it is a
tribute to our enlightened form of government 09
or a commentary on the standards of violence
tolerated in American society, there can be little
doubt that this particular constitutional prohibi-
tion has had slight impact on the administration
of criminal law.
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme
Court put to rest the stagnant reading of the
Eighth Amendment. The Court ruldd that the
clause was to be interpreted progressively, not
only prohibiting the obsolete cruelties of the
Stuarts, but also acquiring new meaning as public
opinion became enlightened by humane justice. 0'
The Court gave added content to the Amendment
when it ruled, in Weems v. United States,102 that
excessive punishments came within the prohibi-
tion of the clause. The sentence for the minor
offense was held to be "cruel in its excess of im-
prisonment and that which accompanies and fol-
lows imprisonment. It is unusual in its character.
Its punishment comes under the condemnation of
the bill of rights, both on account of their degree
and kind".J" The Court used a comparative
5 Meador, supra note 83, at 127.96Halperin, Appellate Reiew of Sentences in Illinois-
Reality or Illusion, 55 ILL. B.J. 300 (1966).
"U.S. CoNsT. Amend. VIII.
3Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment:
An Appraisal of Cruel and Unustal Punishment, 36
N.Y.U. L. REv. 847 & n.7 (1961).
These prohibitions stem from the English Declara-
tion of Rights, 1 W. & M. 2d Sess., s.2 (1688).
100 2 STORY, CoNsTiTuTIoN k 1903.
101 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
102 Weems, a minor official in the United States
Government of the Philippine Islands was convicted
of defrauding the government of 416 pesos. For this
offense he was sentenced to 15 years cadens tenporal,
which included imprisonment at hard labor with a
chain from wrist to ankle at all times, denial of all
assistance from outside the prison, denial of all civil
rights during the term, and surveillance for life after
release. 217 U.S. at 364.
1 0 Id., at 374. The Court cited with approval the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Field who in O'Neil v.
Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1891), said that the
Eighth Amendment is directed not only against
medieval tortures, but against all punishments which
1969]
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standard to determine the excessiveness of the
sentence. Compared to the punishments imposed
for more severe federal and Philippine crimes,
the sentence to Weems was cruel and unusual.
104
Several years later the approach of Weens was
implicitly rejected by the Court in Badders v.
U.S.105 In the absence of a more precise test for
establishing excessiveness, Weems continues to be
cited for the general proposition that a sentence
so manifestly disproportionate to the seriousness
of the offense or of such a nature that it shocks
the conscience violates the Eighth Amendment. 10 6
But few cases have actually so held.107
Today the Weens approach seems to have little
vitality.1" Individualized sentencing is more
by their excessive length or severity are greatly
disproportioned to the offense charged. The whole
prohibition of the Amendment is against that which is
excessive. 217 U.S. at 371.
104Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 380-81
(1910).
105 240 U.S. 391 (1916). In Badders the petitioner
convicted of seven counts of mail fraud, sentenced to
seven five year concurrent terms, and fined $1,000 on
each count appealed on the grounds that the sentence
violated the Eighth Amendment. J. Holmes, a dissenter
in Weems, in writing for the Court summarily dis-
missed the claim by citing a pre-Weems decision,
Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903). In that case
the Court had said that the fact that lesser punish-
ments had been inflicted for an offense of a more
grievous nature did not make the petitioner's sentence
cruel. Undue leniency in one case did not transform
reasonable punishment in another case into a cruel one.
191 U.S. at 135-36. Thus Badders implicitly rejected the
Weems comparative approach.
108 Rogers v. United States, 304 F.2d. 520 (5th Cir.
1962); Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38 (9th Cir.
1959); Mickle v. Henricks, 262 F. 687 (D.C. Nev. 1918).
107 In State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 788
(1952), the defendant was charged with committing
lewd and lascivious acts on a minor. Under the Idaho
sentencing procedure, the trial judge was to set the
maximum authorized by the legislature for each
offense or a life sentence in the instant case. The court
held that since a mandatory maximum term of life for
a class of felony that could include such minor offenses
as "necking" with a fifteen year old would be grossly
disproportionate to the offense and violate the consti-
tution, it would construe the statute as authorizing the
judge to fix a sentence less than life. In State v. Kim-
brough, 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E. 2d 273 (1948), the court
held that a sentence of thirty years at hard labor for
a burglar was cruel and unusual punishment where the
jury had recommended mercy and the defendant had
no past record.
i"eTurkington, Unconstitutionally Excessive Punish-
ments: An Examination of the Eighth Anmendment and
the Weems Principle, 3 Cm. L. BurL. 145 (1967).
Most judges find little that shocks the conscience of
the community. Hendrick v. United States, 357 F.2d
121 (10th Cir. 1966); Rogers v. United States, 304
F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1962); Halprin v. United States,
295 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1961); Gallego v. United States,
276 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Rosen-
berg, 195 F.2d 583 (2nd Cir. 1952).
concerned that the punishment fit the criminal
rather than the crime. A comparative approach
to excessiveness is valueless since prison sentences
in the United States are uniformly lengthy. As a
check on excessive sentences the Weens principle
is dormant, but the Eighth Amendment is not
yet dead. In 1963, dissenting to a denial of cer-
tiorari, three members of the Supreme Court
indicated their willingness to apply constitutional
principles to the criminal sentence."'0
In Rudolph v. State, a young Negro was con-
victed of raping a white woman and was sen-
tenced to death."' He appealed on the ground
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
forbade the imposition of the death penalty on a
convicted rapist who had neither taken nor en-
dangered human life. Justice Goldberg stated
that the following questions seemed relevant and
worthy of argument:"'
1) In light of the trend both in this coun-
try and throughout the world against punish-
ing rape by death, does the imposition of the
death penalty by those States which retain
it for rape violate "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of our ma-
turing society," or "standards of decency
more or less universally accepted"?
2) Is the taking of human life to protect
a value other than human life consistent with
the constitutional proscription against "pun-
ishments which by their excessive.., severity
are greatly disproportioned to the offense
charged"?
3) Can the permissible aims of punish-
ment (e.g., deterrence, isolation, rehabilita-
tion) be achieved as effectively by punishing
rape less severely than by death (e.g., by life
imprisonment); if so, does the imposition of
the death penalty for rape constitute "un-
necessary cruelty"?
The first and second questions resurrect the
Weems approach, comparing the sentence im-
posed with sentences in other jurisdictions and
examining the punishment in light of the offense.
Although this line of inquiry may have relevance
19 Rudolph v. Alabama, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889
(1963) (Goldberg, J., with Brennan and Douglas, J. J.,
dissenting).
110 Rudolph v. State, 275 Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d 662
(1963).
111 Rudolph v. Alabama, cert. denied. 375 U.S. at 889-.
91 (footnotes omitted).
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for the death penalty, it would seem to have only
limited value when applied to prison sentences.
It is the third question that has relevance to
the problem of excessive sentences. The inquiry
must be whether the permissible aims of punish-
ment can be fulfilled as effectively by punishing
the offense less severely, and if so, whether the
imposition of the particular sentence constitutes
unnecessary cruelty. Although Justice Goldberg
was concerned with the imposition of the death
penalty, this type of analysisr-which gives due
process content to the Eighth Amendment-
applies as well to an excessive term of imprison-
ment. Giving due weight to the exercise of judicial
discretion, it must be determined whether or not
the punishment assessed is reasonably necessary
to obtain the legitimate ends sought to be achieved
by the law of corrections.112 If the state interest
is clearly insufficient to justify the punishment
imposed, the sentence is cruelly excessive."'
Clearly, few statutes could be attacked on these
grounds as unconstitutional, since it is difficult to
argue that the mere statutory authorization of a
long prison term violates the Constitution. Only
when a sentence has been imposed on a particular
offender is the analysis operative. Yet the majority
of cases have held that prohibitions such as the
Eighth Amendment are directed to the legisla-
tures."' If a statute does not violate the Constitu-
tion, then any punishment set in conformity
with it cannot be adjudged excessive; it is the power
of the legislature, not the judiciary, to assess
punishment."'
This approach has been qualified. A substantial
minority of cases have established in dicta that a
sentence within a valid statute will not ordinarily
be held cruel and unusual."' By implication
n2 Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77
Haxv. L. Rxv. 1071, 1074 (1964); Note, The Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive
Criminal Law, 79 HAv. L. Rv. 635, 641 (1966).
113 Comment, Revival of the Eighth Amendment:
Development of Cruel Punishment Doctrine by the
Suprene Court, 16 STaN. L. REv. 996, 1011 (1964).
114 Note, supra note 98, at 852.
115 Chavigny v. State, 112 So. 2d 910, 915 (Fla. D.C.
App. 1959), cert. denied, 114 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 922 (1960); State v. McNally, 152
Conn. 598, 211 A.2d 162' (1965). In United States v.
Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 at 607 (2nd Cir. 1952), J.
Frank said that no federal court had explicitly held
that a sentence within a constitutional statute was
cruel and unusual punishment; accord, Pependrea v.
United States, 275 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1960).
11o Black v. United States 269 F.2d 38 (9th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 938 (1960); United States
v. Sorcey, 151 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 794 (1946); Schultz v. Zerbst 73 F.2d 668
(loth Cir. 1934).
then, the Eighth Amendment does control the
exercise of judicial discretion in some instances.
Several cases on the state level have held that
the constitutional prohibition against excessive
punishments applies to judicial as well as legisla-
tive action.117 In Barber v. Gladdenn' s the court
said that the fact that a sentence was within the
statute did not prevent it from violating the con-
stitution,119 although it held that a 25 year sentence
for burglary with explosives did not violate the
prohibition. Singletary v. Wilson20 held that when,
the legislature had not fixed any maximum penalty-
for the crime of forgery, the fine imposed by the
trial judge was subject to the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ments and excessive fines.21 The court reasoned
that when the legislature had delegated unlimited
power to the courts to fix the sentence, the exercise
of judicial power would be governed by the cruel
and unusual punishment clause.
Since legislatures have given the courts wide-
spread discretion to individualize the punishment,
this exercise of judicial power should be governed
by constitutional principles. When statutes permit
the imposition of long sentences, manipulation
of maximum and minimum terms, and discre-
tionary use of probation without the benefit of
legislative guidelines, the Eighth Amendment
should be interpreted to require that the sentence
imposed be reasonably necessary to achieve the
ends of punishment.
A similar constitutional argument may be made
when a defendant is given a sentence which differs
from the sentence received by his co-defendant.
Generally this approach has been rejected by the
courts 1  A recent case, however, held that in
certain circumstances a different sentence for co-
defendants was impermissible 121 The court said
11 Several state constitutions expressly apply the
prohibition to judicial exercise of power. M. DEcr.
RiGnTs art. 25; MAss. DECL. R GHTs art. 26; N.H.
CoNsT. art. I, § 33.
n8 210 Ore. 46, 309 P.2d 192 (1957); see also State v.
Ross, 55 Ore. 450, 104 P. 596 (1909), Modified on
rehearing, 55 Ore. 474, 106 P. 1022 (1910), appeal
dismissed, 227 U.S. 150 (1913).19 ORE. CoNsx. art. I. § 16.
10 191 S.C. 153, 3 S.E.2d 802 (1939).
11 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
12 Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916);
Hedrick v. United States, 357 F.2d 121 (10th Cir.
1966); United States v. Sorcey 151 F.2d 899 (7th Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 794 (1946); Beckett v.
United States, 84 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1936); People v.
Pulaski, 15 Ill. 2d 291, 155 N.E. 2d 29 (1959).
United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir.
1960). The probation application of the defendant, a
minor accessory without a criminal record, was not
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that while it would not have granted probation
to the defendant in the circumstances, it could
not say that the trial judge's refusal to grant
probation was an abuse of discretion, but the
court added that to single out arbitrarily a minor
defendant for the imposition of a more severe
sentence than was received by co-defendants
was an error which the court would correct by
exercising its supervisory power in aid of its
appellate jurisdictionj1 Although it seems rash
to say that the court was arguing on an equal
protection basisu 5 this sort of analysis would have
been an appropriate ground for decision. There
was no apparent rational basis for differentiation
between the co-defendants. Since the defendant
was a minor offender without a criminal record,
it is arguable that a sentence more severe than
those of his co-defendants violated his constitu-
tional right to equal treatment under the law.
considered by the judge because the defendant had
pled not guilty and stood trial. After conviction, the
trial judge imposed a three year prison sentence. Co-
defendants who were principals in the crime and had
criminal records received one and two year sentences.
The appellate court held that the refusal of the trial
judge to consider an application for probation because
the defendant had stood trial was erroneous and
remanded the case for consideration of the defendant's
application. United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 455 (7th
Cir. 1960). The trial court then denied the application
and reimposed the three year sentence.
utUnited States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500, 502-03
(1960).
'2 Rubin, Disparity and Equality of Senknces-
A Constitutional Challenge, 40 F.R.D. 55, 63-64 (1966).
Mr. Rubin claims that the court's statement that the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying
probation indicates that it is implicitly basing its
decision on a constitutional theory of equal protection.
The court, however, claimed that although the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in denying probation,
he did abuse it when he set a three year sentence.
Since proper individualization of punishment
requires a consideration by the trial judge of all
the facets of the crime and criminal, there will be
numerous bases for rationalizing differences in
sentences. For this reason the burden of proving
irrational differentiation will be great, and the
equal protection clause may be of limited effec-
tiveness. But such an analysis is available to
strike down a dearly arbitrary basis for differen-
tiating between offenders, as when a minor ac-
complice without a prior record is given a more
severe sentence than the principal offender.
CONCLUSION
The trend toward individualized disposition
has produced widespread differences in sentences
imposed upon offenders convicted of the same
crime. Some of these differences are attributable
to valid objective factors. But in other cases the
disparity can only be attributed to the identity
of the trial judge and cannot be rationally justi-
fied. Subjective and ambiguous perception of the
relevant factors in sentencing by the trial bench
has produced unjustified disparity in sentences.
Until sentencing factors become more capable
of objective determination, the legal system
should provide boundaries for the exercise of
judicial discretion. The sentencing function should
be left to the unchecked discretion of the trial
judge only when the exercise of that discretion
becomes totally just and scientific. Pending a
more adequate formulation of sentencing objec-
tives and factors, the sentencing process should
be reformed by revision of penal codes to control
the use of the indeterminate sentence and to
distinguish between the ordinary and extended
sentence, and by appellate review of sentences.
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APPENDix A
SAMPLE FROM A SENTENCING INSTITUTE
Synopsis of a pre-sentence report given to each judge.
The defendant is a thirty-six year old white male who pleaded guilty to robbing a Savings and Loan of $1,863
with a toy gun. He had a minor criminal record, had been previously committed for insanity and was technically
in the custody of the hospital when he was arrested. Psychiatric testimony at the hearing resulted in a diagnosis
of sociopathic personality and anti-social reaction.




Number % Number %
1. Civil commitment ........................................... 1 1.8 - -
2. Commitment under § 4244 to determine capacity ............... 1 1.8 10 21.3
3. Probation with psychiatric care ............................... 3 5.6 1 2.1
4. Commitment under § 4208 (b) ............................... 28 51.9 15 31.9
5. Straight sentence
0-4 years ............................................... 2 3.7 2 4.2
5-9 years ............................................... 6 11.1 3 6.4
10-14 years .............................................. 4 7.4 4 8.5
15-20 years .............................................. 2 3.7 1 2.1
6. Indeterminate sentence under § 4208 (a) (2)
0-4 years ............................................... - - 1 2.1
5-9 years ............................................... 1 1.8 4 8.5
10-14 years .............................................. 2 3.7 2 4.2
15-20 years .............................................. 3 5.6 3 6.4
7. Sentence under § 4208 (a) (1) 1 year min.-10 year max .......... 1 1.8 1 2.1
Source: Seminar and Institute on Disparity of Sentences, 30 F.R.D. 401, at 501 (1962).
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In Britton v. United States,1 two men were
prosecuted for the armed robbery of thirty dollars
from a branch United States Post Office. 2 Bruton's
codefendant, Evans, confessed his participation
in the crime to both state and federal officials;3 his
statement, introduced into evidence at their
joint trial through testimony of a federal investi-
gator, directly implicated Bruton. Neither de-
fendant testified, and both appealed their convic-
tions.4 Evans' conviction was reversed because his
1391 U.S. 123 (1968). Noted, 82 HAv. L. R1v. 231
(1968).
2 18 U.S.C. § 2114.
He first confessed to a local detective who notified
the Postal Inspector. State charges against him on
other alleged crimes were dropped after Evans ad-
mitted his participation in the postal robbery. Evans v.
United States, 375 F.2d 355, 358-9 (8th Cir. 1967).4 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124 (1968).
confession was held inadmissible.5  Bruton's
conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals of
the Eighth Circuit.6 The Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari.7
The basic postulate analyzed in this case
concerned the jury's ability to follow limiting
instructions with regard to a confession of one
defendant which implicated the other 8 The
5 Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 361 (8th
Cir. 1967). The confession was inadmissible on the
basis-of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). On
retrial Evans was acquitted. Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123, 124 n. 1 (1968).
6 Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir.
1967). The court relied on Delli Paoli v. United States,
352 U.S. 232 (1957), see p. 197 of text and note 26 infra.
7389 U.S. 818 (1967).
8 Three articles in this general area are 3 Cor.. J.
LAW & Soc. PROB. 80 (1967); 51 MmuN. L. REv. 264
(1966); 36 U. CnT. L. REv. 306 (1967).
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confession, although relevant as to Evans, was
inadmissible hearsay as to Bruton; Bruton was
unable to cross-examine its content. 9 The trial
judge had instructed the jury to disregard the
confession of Evans insofar as it implicated Bruton
when it determined the latter's guilt or innocence. 10
The Supreme Court decided that: "because of
the substantial risk that the jury, despite instruc-
tions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating
extrajudicial statements in determining peti-
tioner's guilt, admission of Evans' confession in
this joint trial violated petitioner's right of cross-
examination secured by the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment"." This conclusion was
based upon the rationale and spirit of two recent
decisions, Pointer v. Texas"2 and Jackson v. Denno,"3
which dealt with substantially different problems.
Pointer held that within the guaranty of the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause is the
defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses
against him.14 The Court in Bruton reasoned
that the jury could not follow the limiting in-
structions of the judge and, contrary to those
9 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution dictates that "in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.. . ." The hearsay rule is a
product of the same problem that may have made the
Founding Fathers press for such an amendment. Both
the Sixth Amendment and the hearsay rule demand
that unreliable and untrustworthy evidence be kept
out of the consideration by the jury of the defendant's
guilt.
10 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 125 n.2
(1968).11Id. at 126. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293
(1968), holds that Bruton is to be applied retroactively
and under Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), is
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Sixth Amendment, note 9 supra, also may
be relevant to attitudes toward jury competency. If
evidence not subject to the hearsay rule may be intro-
duced against the defendant then the problem becomes
a method of helping the jury decide what weight to
give to each witnesses' testimony. If it sees the witness
and views his reactions and demeanor, the jury will be
able to determine the correct weight to give his damag-
ing testimony. But the Constitution recognizes the
dangers of allowing the jury to review evidence without
any information as to the nature of the source.
380 U.S. 400 (1965).
13 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
1
4Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-7 (1965).
Bruton analyzes Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1965) as an application of Pointer. There the con-
fessor, already convicted, refused to answer questions
relating to a statement he made which had implicated
the defendant. The Court said this was a denial of
effective confrontation as the jury may have inferred
that the statement was made and that it was true. The
opinion emphasized that effective confrontation would
have been possible only if the confessor had affirmed
the statement as his own.
admonitions, applied the full force of the con-
fessor's implicating statements against Bruton in
its consideration of his guilt.15 If the jury con-
sidered the confession in relation to Bruton he was
effectively denied his right to cross-examine this
adverse witness.
It was Jackson which cast doubt on the jury's
ability to follow limiting instructions. Jackson
held unconstitutional a New York procedure by
which the jury first determined the voluntariness
of the alleged confession and then the guilt of
the confessor.16 By this procedure, "the fact of a
defendant's confession is solidly implanted in the
jury's mind", 7 and it would be "difficult, if not
impossible," to show that a confession, found to
be involuntary, did nevertheless influence the
jury's deliberations as to the guilt of the de-
fendant." Once significantly prejudicial or un-
reliable evidence is exposed to the jury, its full
impact cannot be lessened by a charge to the jury
on its proper or limited use. Bruton reasons that
such evidence, in fact, is not disregarded by the
jury and that the defendant must be able to
cross-examine its source. If he does not have that
chance he is denied the Confrontation Clause
guaranties as articulated in Pointer.9
Mr. Justice White, who along with Mr. Justice
Harlan dissented in Bruton, had "no doubt that
serious minded and responsible men are able to
shut their minds to unreliable information when
exercising their judgement"; he thus rejected
"the assumption of the majority that giving
instructions to a jury to disregard a codefendant's
confession is an empty gesture".20 He never
reached the Confrontation Clause issue because
he did not believe Jackson was applicable to the
problem of a codefendant's confession. Jackson
was distinguished on two grounds: First, while a
defendant's own admission is the most damaging
Is Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968).
16 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377 (1964).
17 Id. at 388.
Is Id. at 389. Justice Harlan wrote a strong dissenting
opinion which notes first, that the Court had never
before mistrusted the jury and, second, that the prob-
lem of a jury's ability to follow instructions is present
in all situations. Id. at 430. For a suggestion that the
majority's rationale ought to extend to search and
seizure cases, see 4 Hous. L. REv. 139 (1966).
1a Mr. justice Stewart, concurring, said that the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause itself pre-
cludes reliance on limiting instructions. Certain evi-
dence is so prejudicial that a jury cannot be trusted to
apply the instruction correctly even though the trial
judge instructed it on that point. Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 137-8 (1968).
20 Id. at 143.
[Vol. 60
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION OF CODEFENDANT
evidence against him, the admissions of a code-
fendant are viewed with special suspicion.n
Through the judge's instructions the jury (who
may well perceive this problem through its own
analysis) realizes that a codefendant's confession
has little evidentiary value against the defendant.
Second, while a coerced confession is not neces-
sarily unreliable as to truth, the basis for pro-
hibiting a codefendant's statement from applying
to another defendant is its essential unreliability
and untrustworthiness.n Again, "this the jury
can be told and can understand".2 The dissent
also noted that the inevitable result of the ma-
jority's holding is separate trials for potential
codefendants, which would be administratively
burdensome and provide for "varying conse-
quences for legally indistinguishable defendants".2
Unfortunately, Justice White does not expand on
this latter risk, which, however, would not be
great in the Bruton context because there the
defendants are distinguishable; one had confessed
and the other had not. The difference in a court's
treatment of the two would be the result of
evidentiary factors and not simply the result of
separate trials.
Justice White was in accord with Delli Paoli v.
United States25 which the majority overruled.
Delli Paoli held that a codefendant's statement
was admissible at a joint trial solely against the
declarant, and that the jury was capable of
following the judge's admonitions to use that
evidence only in that limited capacity. The
Court had listed five separate indicia relevant to
determining whether or not the jury had followed
the instructions: 1) that the case involved an
easily understood conspiracy; 2) that the separate
interests of each defendant were repeatedly
emphasized throughout the trial; 3) that the
confession was not admitted until the rest of the
government's case was presented, which facili-
tated separate consideration of it; 4) that the
21 1d. at 141.
2 Id. at 142.
23 Id.2 4 Id. at 143. It is interesting that while Mr. Justice
White rises to defend jury capability against the
majority's attacks he admits that at trials of legally
indistinguishable defendants there may be two differ-
ent results. Certainly one factor he must look to in
order to account for this consequence is the nature of
the jury and its possible propensity to be influenced
by feelings or facts other than those which are con-
sidered legally significant and relevant.
25 352 U.S. 232 (1957). The case involved the prose-
cution of five codefendants on a federal charge of
conspiring to deal unlawfully in alcohol.
confession was merely corroborative and cumula-
tive of other evidence already presented against
the non-confessing defendant; and 5) that nothing
appeared on the record to indicate confusion on
the part of the jury.26
After setting out these factors, the Delli Paoli
Court observed that the jury system would
make "little sense" unless the Court presumed
that the jury would follow clear instructions in
circumstances such as indicated by the listed five
factors.n The opinion acknowledged the existence
of "practical limitations" to the presumption of
the jury's competence, but rejected the claim that
those limits were reached on the facts before the
Court.n While not articulated in the opinion,
these limitations are probably those which aroused
the Bruton Court just eleven years later: evidence
admitted in a manner which would lead to serious
misconceptions by a jury who could not disregard
it. The majority emphasized the necessity to
determine the extent of reliance on the jury's
competence on a case by case basis and believed
that the trial judge was best suited to handle
these problems.
The Court in Bruton referred to a number of
cases both before and after Delli Paoli which
rejected the general outlook portrayed in that
case.29 People v. Aranda,0 a Supreme Court of
California decision after Delii Paoli, held that
after the prosecutor had related the defendants in
his summation it would be "highly unlikely"
that the jury could have disregarded the confes-
sion of one defendant when considering the co-
defendant's guilt. 1 However, the opinion care-
fully notes that the admission of the confession
would not always be prejudicial.12 Three possible
alternatives were discussed:
1. A joint trial would be allowed if all references
26 Id. at 241-2.
2 Id. at 242. See also Opper v. United States, 348
U.S. 84, 95 (1954) (rejected "unfounded speculation"
that jurors disregarded clear instructions which theory
if followed would upset the judicial system's reliance
"upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions.");
Barnes v. United States, 374 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir.
1967); Golliiaer v. United States, 362 F.2d 594, 603
(8th Cir. 1966); Monts v. State, 214 Tenn. 171, 190,
379 S.W.2d 34, 42 (1964).
2 Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 242
(1957).
29 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129-30,
n.4 (1968). See People v. Vitagliano, 15 N.Y.2d 360k
206 N.E.2d 864, 258 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1965).
30 407 P.2d 265, 63 Cal.2d 518 (1965).
31 Id. at 270 n.5, 63 Cal.2d at 527 n.5.82id.
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were deleted effectively without prejudice to
either the declarant or the codefendant.
2. Severance would be granted if the prosecution
insisted on using the confession and no effective
deletion was possible.
3. The confession would be totally excluded if
there was no effective means of deletion and
neither the prosecutor nor the defendant wanted
severance.37
When evidence of prior crimes has been ad-
mitted for the jury's consideration only as to
sentencing, a court has rejected the notion that
instructions could erase that evidence from the
minds of the jury in their determination of the
defendant's guilt.3 In a subsequent case the
Supreme Court rejected this holding, but it is
interesting to note that the rationale of two prior
cases sounded much like that of the Bruton
Court.35 United States v. Banmiller believed that to
expect the jury to so compartmentalize the evi-
dence before it would require "psychological
-1Id. at 272-3, 63 Cal.2d at 530-31. As can be seen
from these alternatives, the California court also is
willing to place great reliance on the discretion of the
trial judge. See generally Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750 (1946); Shepard v. United States, 290
U.S. 96 (1933); Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17
(5th Cir. 1955); Hale v. United States, 25 F.2d 430
(8th Cir. 1928).
34 United States v. Banimiller, 310 F.2d 720 (3rd
Cir. 1962).
35 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). Spencer
also suggested that where the "conceded possibility of
prejudice is believed to be outwieghed by the validity
of the State's purpose in permitting introduction of
the evidence," the defendant could be adequately
protected by limiting instructions. Id. at 561. This case
involved the admission of other crimes evidence under
a recidivist statute. The Court said that this evidence is
usually documentary and not inflammatory. It cited
Ddli .Paoli for the observation that "the jury is expected
to follow instructions in limiting this evidence to its
proper function, and... [that] ... the convenience of
trying different crimes against the same person, and
connected crimes against different defendants, in the
same trial is a valid governmental interest." Id. at
562. The Court further lectures, at 565, that:
It would be extravagent in the extreme to take
Jackson as evincing a general distrust on the part
of this Court of the ability of juries to approach
their task responsibly and to sort out discreet
issues given to them under proper instructions
by the judge in a criminal case, or as standing for
the proposition that limiting instructions can
never purge the erroneous introduction of evidence
or limit evidence to its rightful purpose.
See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
However, admission of a prior conviction which is
constitutionally infirm is inherently prejudicial. Burgett
v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967). See also Lane v. Warden,
320 F.2d. 179 (4th Cir. 1963); United States v. Jacan-
gelo, 281 F.2d 574 (3rd Cir. 1960). See generally 78
HARv. L. Rlv. 426 (1964); 70 YALE L. 3. 763 (1961).
wizardry" on its part.3 The danger is removed
only by admitting such evidence after the deter-
mination of guilt. In this way the threat of the
misuse of such evidence is completely erased.
This solution is similar to one factor that the
Deli .Paoli Court found important-the timing of
the admission of the confession.Y Both courts
indicated that separating the evidence for the jury
as best as possible would be of significant aid to it
in its decision-making process and would signifi-
cantly remove the threat of prejudicial error.
Bruton does not explain what procedures are
adequate to protect a defendant from the in-
criminating confession of a codefendant; it only
rules that limiting instructions are inadequate.N
In a footnote, the Court doubts the effectiveness
of redaction-the elimination of the defendant's
name from the codefendant's confession---as an
alternative although the practice is widespread.3 9
This could follow logically from the spirit of
Bruton. The Court's premise is that the jury is
unable (unwilling?) to limit evidence relevant and
admissible to one defendant to that defendant
alone. While the Court does not explain whether
or not this is a conscious act, it claims that the
jury actually uses the evidence in its considera-
tion of another defendant against whom the
evidence is relevant but inadmissible. Even
though the codefendant's name has been deleted
36 United States v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720, 725
(3rd Cir. 1962).
n See p. 4 supra.
Is Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968).
On the efficacy of limiting instructions, see generally
Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38
NEB. L. REv. 744 (1959); 49 MimN. L. REv. 360 (1964);
74 YALE L. J. 553 (1965); 131 A.L.R. 908 (1941).
11 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 n.10
(1968). For other looks at redaction, see also Kramer v.
United States, 317 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1963); United
States v. Jacangelo, 281 F.2d 574 (3rd Cir. 1960);
People v. Clark, 17 Ill.2d 486, 162 N.E.2d 413 (1959)
People v. Barbaro, 395 Ill. 264, 69 N. E2d 692 (1946);
State v. Young, 46 N.J. 152, 215 A.2d 352 (1965); State
v. Rosen 151 Ohio St. 339, 86 N.E.2d 24 (1949). Tan
ABA PROJECT ON MnMtM STANAmRDS FOR CRMINAL
JusTcE, joinder and Severance § 2.3, 3 Crim. L. Rep.
2404, requires that:
... when a defendant moves for severance because
an out of court statement of a codefendant makes
reference to him but is not admissible against him,
the court determines whether the prosecution
intends to offer the statement in evidence at the
trial. If so the court should require the prosecuting
attorney to elect one of the following courses:...
a joint trial at which the statement is admitted into
evidence only after all references to the moving
defendant have been deleted, provided that as
deleted, the confession will not prejudice the
moving defendant; ....
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the jury can insert the codefendant's name in the
appropriate space. Since the defendants are
tried together this substitution process would be
natural and possibly even encouraged, depending
on the other evidence in the case. If all indirect
and direct references to the codefendants are
deleted, the prejudice may run the other way and
harm the declarant's case by presenting a distorted
picture of the scope of the confession. Oral testi-
mony adds another dimension to the problem of
controlling the jury's consideration of certain
evidence. Oral misstatements or accidents are
likely to occur, and no effective redaction may be
practically achievable. On the basis of these
considerations the Court will probably not accept
redaction as substitute for the right to cross-
examine.
A second alternative is the total exclusion of
the confession from the evidence. This approach
would seem to be consistent on the broadest
level with the Court's admonition in Miranda v.
Arizona that the "need" for confessions is often-
times exaggerated.4" In that case the Court was
reaffirming the Constitutional safeguards to be
followed in obtaining confessions. In Bruton the
Court is enforcing the limiting safeguards neces-
sary for the use of that confession in evidence
once it has been legally obtained. In either situa-
tion the Court contends that there will be "no
marked detrimental effect on criminal law en-
forcement.., as a result of these rules".4' In
neither area is the possible administrative or
procedural burden so great-as it might be in
separate trials-as to outweigh the necessity of
protecting the defendant's rights to their fullest
degree. 42 But if automatic exclusion or separate
trials would be the only two alternatives, the
number of trials would increase and burden the
already overcrowded court system, inconvenience
witnesses, and possibly require repetition of
substantial amounts of evidence. This would be
the dilemma that the courts would face if deletion
or redaction is considered insufficient protection
for the defendant, and the only alternatives are
exclusion or severance. However, the Court's
present philosophy will not allow the subordina-
tion of the individual's rights because of administra-
tive cost alone.
43
40 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966).
4
1Id. at 489.
,1 See counter argument by Mr. justice White in his
dissent in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 143
(1968).
3Id. at 134-5. In 1967 D=KE L.J. 202, 204, the
The opinion does not describe when the "sub-
stantial threat" to the defendant's right to con-
frontation crystallizes." Certainly there are
"many circumstances" where reliance on the
juror's ability to be discriminating in his use of
the evidence is justified.4 In "such cases" limiting
instructions are effective protection for the
defendant's rights.4 But "some contexts" (such as
in Brutotn) present risks when "the practical and
human limitations of the jury system cannot be
ignored". 4  The Court never becomes more
specific in its description of when a mere threat to
this right becomes substantial enough to cause
the full force of the Constitutional shield to
come into play. It is possible that it is depending
sub silento on the doctrine of harmless error which
recognizes that there are violations of Consti-
tutional demands of such an insignificant nature
that reversal due to them alone is not required. 4'
dilemma was posed as one between three factors: 1) the
administrative convenience and judicial economy of
joint trials; 2) the evidentiary value of confessions of
less than all of the defendants; and 3) the preservation
of the codefendant's right to a fair trial.
44 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968).
Two courts have interpreted "substantial threat" to
depend in part on whether or not the confession of the
codefendants varied materially, in Johnson v. Yeager,
399 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1968) the confessions did vary
and presented a "serious risk" that the determination
of guilt was not reliable. But in People v. De Vine,
293 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Queens Cty. Sup. Ct., N.Y. 1968),
the court felt that the "facts in this movant's case fall
far short of compliance with the principles laid down
in Bruton..." as each confession was "one and the
same" with the other. On this point it distinguished
Johnson v. Yeager, supra. The court also emphasized
the careful and frequent limiting instructions by the
trial judge. See also Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d
296 (2d Cir. 1968).
Bruton's confrontation rationale has also affected
certain state hearsay concepts; see Schepps v. State,
432 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1968), which held
that no longer could a principal's confession be admitted
as proof of his guilt in the trial of an accomplice. In this
case the alleged principal himself did not testify.
45 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).
46 Id.
47 Id.
4'See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-4
(1967). If in terms of the Constitution there has been
error, reversal is still not automatic unless the error
affects the substantial rights of the parties. The bene-
ficiary of the error is required to prove that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court was
striving for a "more workable" standard. Id. at 24.
Contra, Smithson v. State, 247 A.2d 542 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1968) (harmless error rule will not be
applicable to Bruton). In United States v. Guajardo-
Melendez, 401 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1968), in dictum the
court said that since the defendant's counsel "had the
opportunity to cross-examine [the confessing defend-
ant] but he declined to do so, therefore ... the con-
frontation clause rationale of Braton, although persua-
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If the investigation is to be along these sug-
gested lines the important determination is
whether "there is a reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of might have contributed to
the conviction".49 Whether or not there is a
"reasonable possibility" that the evidence will
affect the outcome in the Bruton context depends
largely on the capability and attitude of the fact
finder. Justice Brennan admitted the "impossi-
bility" of determining how the jury handled the
confession in Bruton.5" But he believed that since
this gap in the Court's knowledge did not produce
a different result in Jackson, it alone should not
disturb the Court in following that rationale in
Bruton.51 Both cases are dependent in part on
conclusions about jury behavior which may be
widely assumed but are not empirically verifiable.
The very few attempts at studying the jury
have produced findings that would support the
majority's opinion.52 But the reliability and
comprehensiveness of these studies should be taken
into account before citing them as authority upon
which to build the law of the land. They have
sive, would not seem to be literally applicable." The
court went on to frame its opinion more in accord with
the Deli Paoli principles by observing that the con-
fession added little to the case against the confessor but
that the statement was "deadly poison" to the de-
fendant. See also United States v. Levinson, 405
F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1968); People v. Williams, 4
Crim. L. Rep. 2354 (Ill. Ct. App. 1969); Lipscomb v.
Maryland, 248 A.2d 491 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968).
However, Santoro v. United States, 402 F.2d 920 (9th
Cir. 1968) disagrees with the Guarjardo dictum in that it
states that the mere opportunity to confront is not
enough. The court felt compelled to distinguish Guar-
jardo on the fact that in the case before it the confession
was highly significant evidence. It already appears
that exactly what is a serious violation of Bruton is not
clear.
49 Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).
60 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968).
61 1d. at 136-7.
62 See Hoffman & Brodley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L.
Rxv. 235 (1952); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, Tim
AHNEscAN Juny, 149-62, 521-23 (1966); Moffat, As
Jurors See a Law Suit, 24 ORE. L. Rv. 199 (1945). See
generally Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury
Project, 38 NEB. L. lEv. 744 (1959). Many have
suggested without empirical or other evidence that
juries in various contexts are incapable of performing
the task of limiting the applicability of evidence. See
generally, Jennings, Preserving the Right to Confronta-
tion-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal
Trials, 113 U. PA. L. Rxv. 741, 754 (1965); Maguire &
Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining
the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 H v. L. REv. 392,
393 (1927); Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the
Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43
HAzv. L. REv. 165, 168-9 (1929); 68 CoLuIS. L. REv.
774, 775 (1968); 4 Hous. L. Rlv. 139, 142 (1966); 39
J. C=r. L.C. & P.S. 498,501 (1948); 49 Mnvn. L. REv.
360.362 (1964); 74 YALE L.T. 553, 555 (1965).
been few in number, and their samples are far from
representltive. Simulated juries may not provide
an accurate reflection of the actual process be-
cause those involved are consciously aware of the
laboratory conditions of the trial. Actual juries
are difficult subjects for any trustworthy empirical
study. It seems that consideration of irrelevant
prejudicial evidence by the jury is either so
obvious that it needs no proof or so impossible to
prove that it must be and is accepted on faith
based on inferences from experience. The majority
reasons that if the judge could play his proper
role and exclude all the prejudicial evidence the
jury could function in its normal role; but the
spirit of Bruton will damage the unwritten trust
in the jury's ability when it is relied upon to do
comparable or even more difficult tasks than it
faced in Bruton.
Furthermore, it is conceptually plausible that
the problems created by the human frailities
displayed by the jury as exposed in this decision
have played something other than a totally
negative role in the system. If the jury is the
conscience of the community, relying on its
extra-legal experience, perceptions, and common
sense, then, necessarily, it sometimes will act
outside its narrow legal role but still within the
bounds of justice. For example, it is usually
assumed in a personal injury case involving an
individual plaintiff against a large corporate
railroad that the jury gives the benefit of the
doubt to the individual in determining the close
cases since the railroad could better bear the loss.
Some would argue that this prejudice is construc-
tive and reasonable even though the jury in such
case is no longer the objective finder of fact. Of
course, it is always subject to control by the
appellate courts. It is this flexibility of the jury
system that makes it attractive to some. Dean
Wigmore wrote that the jury "supplies the flexi-
bility of legal rules which is essential to justice and
popular contentment"." Legal institutions deal
with human beings in informal, unnatural roles.
The law cannot expect the jury to divest itself
completely of its human nature in order to render
its verdict. The jury allows the law to be more
responsive to actual attitudes in the society. In
each particular case the jury can aid the adversary
proceeding by evaluating each party's claim
5 Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial,
12 J. Am. Jbo. Soc'y 166, 170 (1929); See generally R.
MORELAND, MODERN CMImWAL PROCEDURE 233-36
(1959).
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through society's eyes. The jury allows society's
interests to have a weight near equal to that of
the individual.
However, these subtle functions of the jury as
well as its more objective duties are now threatened
to be circumscribed. For example, in long, multi-
defendant, multi-count prosecutions the jury
cannot be expected to compartmentalize evidence
as to each defendant and to each count. Bruton's
rationale could not permit a jury to hear the
evidence in a trial with twelve defendants and
eighty-four counts." The jury could not be trusted
to evaluate properly evidence of a limited nature
and not consider it evidence against all of the de-
fendants on some or all of the counts. The in-
structions may be even more ineffective in this
context than in Bruton. The state is faced with
the expense and inconvenience of severed trials
for each defendant or trials of a size which the
court believes can be handled competently by a
jury. Costs to the defendant in terms of time
and expense will rise. There will be a substantial
risk that the jury will consider improper but rel-
evant evidence in the joint trial, but if that
risk is lessened only by separate trials then the
defendant, the state, and the witnesses will suffer
heavy additional expenses of time and money.
Bruton's spirit may also reach the unanswered
question in Griffin v. California:55 does the de-
fendant have a right to a jury instruction com-
manding the jury to disregard his failure to testify?
Some states prohibit the use of any such instruc-
tion." Giving such an instruction may well
"sensitize" 17 the jury to the fact that the de-
fendant has not testified, and it may then draw
prejudicial inferences. But the failure to instruct
at all would allow the jury to reach prejudicial
conclusions based on the fact that the defendant
did not testify. It is then not safe to give the
instruction to the jury; but without the instruction
54 United States v. Branker, 395 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.
1968) reflects this position on these facts. The court
indicated that the difficulties for the jury increase
proportionately to the increase in the number of counts.
See Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511 (1960);
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
65 380 U.S. 609, 615 n.6 (1965).
56See § 546.270, R. S. Mo. 1959, V.A.M.S.; State v.
Dennison, 428 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. 1968) (applying that
statute). Some courts allow such instructions: see
State v. Osborne, 258 Ia. 390, 139 N.W.2d 177 (1965);
State v. Smith, 242 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1968);
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 240 A.2d 354 (Pa. 1968).
That such instructions are not required, see State v.
Senzarino, 39 Ohio Op.2d 383, 224 N.E.2d 389 (1967).
57 Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Proect,
38 NEB. L. REv. 744 (1959).
there is no way to give boundaries to the jury's
considerations. Once Bruton questions the jury's
ability to follow limiting instructions when evaluat-
ing relevant but somewhat applicable evidence, it
may also apply if evidence is before the jury with-
out any instruction. In the latter case there will
not even be an attempt to limit the jury's applica-
tion of the evidence and, if Bruton is correct as to
how it may use such evidence even under instruc-
tion, then serious prejudices may result.
A problem may also arise when curative in-
structions are given after improper remarks are
made by a prosecutor.Y If the Bruton rationale is
that the jury is unable to disregard certain evidence
against one defendant, will it be able to rid itself
of or limit the effect of any evidence which is
before it at all? Even if a motion to strike from
the record is granted and the jury is told to dis-
regard, the assumption could be that it probably
will not or cannot disregard if the matter is
relevant even though improper. The prosecutor-
the symbol of the state--can be as influential and
damaging in his remarks to the citizen juror as
other evidence he considers. The court can always
label the prosecutor's remarks as prejudicial, but
the problem is in trusting the jury to disregard
solely because of that instruction.59
53 For a rejection of the effectiveness of curative
instructions, see United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505
(7th Cir. 1968).
59 Other problems in joint jury trials may arise. An
interesting situation arose in Parman v. United States,
399 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1968) where the defendant
argued that the intermingling of the defense on the
merits and the defense of insanity worked to his
prejudice. The court rejected this claim but recog-
nized "the disadvantages of a trial without bifurcation
might have been substantially diminished by a bi-
furcated trial before one jury." It obviously would
reconsider if "serious and substantial" prejudice could
be shown. The issue now arises, analogous to Jackson v.
Denno, supra, whether the same jury can effectively
and fairly consider the evidence of these two possibly
conflicting defenses.
Another possible problem arose in Huntt v. Russell,
285 F.Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1968) where the codefendant
changed his plea to guilty before the jury. No instruc-
tions were requested or given to the jury on their duty
to disregard this action as to the defendant. The court
did not believe that this error was substantial enough
to cause reversal. This result may need to be recon-
sidered under the Bruton rationale.
Complicated instructions in aiding and abetting
cases may also be troublesome under a Bruton analysis;
see 68 CoLum. L. REv. 744 (1968). For the weaknesses
of the jury in following instructions in lesser included
offenses cases, see 3 LAN & WATR L. Rxv. 587 (1968),
which refers to the jury's inherent power to find the




The problems surveyed with regard to con-
fessions and the jury's competency to handle
them in accordance with instructions should have
an answer. But in dealing with confessions a
simple, mechanical rule is not effective. Possibly
some arbitrary line could be drawn as to the
number of defendants and issues before the jury at
any one time. But the impact and relevance of a
confession varies greatly, depending upon the
particular circumstance in which it is found.6"
This requires that there be considerable discretion
placed in the hands of the trial judge who will
have the best knowledge of those factors that
need to be controlled. Discretion at this level
promotes an efficient and just system.
A realistic approach within the scope of Bruton
would permit a trial judge to rule before trial on
the necessity of a severance. Rule 14 of the
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE would
be both applicable and useful here. It provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the government
is prejudiced by joinder of offenses or of defendants
in an indictment or information or for such joinder
for trial together, the court may order an election
or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of
defendants or provide whatever relief justice
requires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant for
severance the court may order the attorney for the
government to deliver to the court for inspection
in camera any statements or confessions made by
the defendants which the government intends to
introduce in evidence at the trial.61
The defendant's pretrial motion for severance
would require the state to produce at a hearing
both the alleged confession and affadavits of the
testimony to be proffered at the trial. Also, the
prosecutor should be prepared to reveal when in
the proceeding he intends to introduce the state-
ment. The burden would be on the state to demon-
strate that a joint trial would not prejudice the
nondeclarant. The following factors would be of
61 This attitude was reflected in both Bruton and
Delli Paoli. In Bruton the Court recognized that some-
times limiting instructions could be effective. Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 153 (1968). In Ddli .Paoli
it was made clear that sometimes limiting instructions
would be ineffective to protect a codefendant. Deli
Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 243 (1957).
61 The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules fol-
lowing Rule 14 recognize the Bruton problem and state
that the purpose of the section "is to provide a proce-
dure whereby the issue of possible prejudice can be re-
solved on the motion for severance."
significance to the judge in deciding on the ne-
cessity for severance:
1. The size of the trial and the scope of the
confession.
Since Bruton was based on uncomplicated facts,
the relative complexity of the trial facts can no
longer be an important factor; the state can no
longer protest severance on the grounds that the
case would be easily understood. If the trial is a
large one, and the confessions vary in scope, the
judge may want to review the nature of the
confessions to see if the implications therein, if
any, would prejudice other defendants. If the
confession only covers some of the counts, a joint
trial would require some difficult compartmentaliz-
ing of the evidence by the jury. If the confession
encompasses all of the counts to the declarant only
and other facts are favorable to the state, then
possibly the confession can still be admitted in a
joint trial.
2. Timing of the introduction of the confession.
The jury may be more discriminating in the use of
a confession presented at the end of the trial than
a confession offered earlier in the proceeding. Or,
possibly, if all evidence as to one defendant can be
presented apart from the evidence as to the rest,
the jury would have less trouble in properly using
the evidence. Again, the scope of the confession
would be relevant as to whom it implicates and
the nature of the implications.
3. The cumulative nature of the confession with
respect to the other evidence.
If the judge views the state's affadavits in a light
most favorable to the defendant and he concludes
that the state may have a prima facie case without
the confession, then instead of contending that
the admission of the confession would not be
error, it is best to exclude the confession and retain
the joint trial. Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure allows the judge to grant
"whatever relief justice requires". Therefore, he
could deny the motion for severance but still
require the exclusion of the confession. This
would force the state to decide a) how critical the
confession is to its case against the declarant, and
b) if it wants to or needs to bear the cost of separate
trials. If the state does not seem to present a
prima face case, then severance will depend on
the strength of the other factors the judge con-
siders.
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Confessions constitute a sensitive and hard
problem for law enforcement agencies and for the
courts. Without a confession in evidence juries will
be forced to determine guilt on a factual recon-
struction of the act and not on the basis of what
an accused said. Confessions would still be useful
in the process of gathering the basic fact founda-
tion but would have less an impact on the trial.
If the judge decides before trial to exclude the
confession then the efficiencies of the joint trial
can be retained. Another way to look at this
factor would be to consider how seriously would it
prejudice the prosecutor's case to exclude the
confession from evidence. This would highlight the
basic decision being made: balancing the interests
of fairness for the codefendant against the state's
interest in using a confession in a joint trial.
The three aforementioned factors which were
relied upon in Delli Paoli are still relevant and
effective indicia of possible prejudice to the
codefendant if used the way here suggested. The
two other Delli Paoli factors-that the separate
interest of the defendant is repeatedly emphasized
throughout trial, and that the record does not
show confusion on the part of the jury-have
little, if any, remaining weight. Bruton held that
limiting instructions emphasizing the separate
interests of the defendants are not enough to
protect their rights. Indications of jury confusion
no longer would be relevant in the suggested
pretrial procedure. Even during the trial the
confusion and the source of the confusion would
be hard to determine and would not be a good basis
upon which to measure the extent of fairness in a
joint trial.
This pretrial procedure would not be an added
burden on the court's time when weighed against
the time that would otherwise be taken up in
numerous retrials of misjoined cases. If the de-
fendant never makes a motion to sever until the
trial starts, the burden would rest on him to
show that the trial judge clearly abused his dis-
cretion under a rule such as Federal Rule 14
permitting the joint trial.
It is hard to foresee whether this plan would be
viable and useful in all situations, but an attempt
should be made to preserve the advantages of the
joint trial. Law enforcemen: agencies are going
to be forced to depend less on confessions and it
would be over-ambitious and wasteful for the
prosecutor to demand the inclusion of an un-
necessary confession at the cost of the benefits of
the joint trial. Bruton reflects the Court's con-
tinulng sensitivity towards the problems involved
in securing and using confessions but it also
develops an approach which will reduce the
opportunity for both the state and the defendant
to benefit through. the use of the joint trial.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE FOR COURT ORDERED ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE: DOES IT MEET THE STANDARDS OF
BERGER AND KATZ?
STEPHEN LINZER
Recent criminal law decisions of the United
States Supreme Court have displayed a growing
concern for the individual in society and for his
right to be free from governmental intrusions upon
his privacy.1 At the same time, there has been an
awareness on the part of individual members of the
Court that crime, specifically organized crime, is
growing rapidly and can only be controlled and
limited by effective law enforcement procedures.
2
1 The legal concept of a right to privacy was dis-
cussed by Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 H~Av. L. REv. 193, 198 (1890). See, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2 See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 113-14
(1967), White, J., dissenting.
These two considerations-the right to privacy and
the need to stop the growth of crime-are at con-
flict in the current controversy over the use of
electronic surveillance' to aid in the investigation
of serious crime.
Because of the nature of their operations and
the need for secrecy, criminal groups utilize a
minimum of written communications. However,
the diversity of their enterprises, the large number
3As used, electronic surveillance includes eaves-
dropping, wiretapping, and all techniques or devices
by which a person is able to hear or record the com-
munications of others. For a history of electronic
surveillance see DAsr, KowLrToN, and SCHwARTZ, THE
EAVESDROPPERs, 23-34 (1959).
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